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ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the environmental integrity, the nature and the political 
relevance of the Copenhagen Accord. According to the first two parameters, the 
Copenhagen Accord is not satisfactory. From a political point of view the conclusion is 
slightly different, albeit not positive. This paper concludes arguing that after the 
Copenhagen Conference the future of the international climate change legal regime is likely 
to be more fragmented, the Accord being one further piece of the global carbon puzzle. 
 
RESUM: Aquesta nota analitza la integritat ambiental, la natura i la rellevança política de 
l’Acord de Copenhaguen. D’acord amb els dos primers paràmetres, l’Acord de 
Copenhaguen no és satisfactori. Des del punt de vista polític, tanmateix, la conclusió és 
lleugerament diferent, tot i que no positiva. Aquesta nota conclou defensant que, després de 
l’Acord de Copenhaguen, el futur del règim jurídic internacional del canvi climàtic serà, 
previsiblement, més fragmentat, essent l’Acord una peça més dintre del trencaclosques 
global del carboni. 
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RESUMEN: Esta nota analiza la integridad ambiental, la naturaleza y la relevancia política 
del Acuerdo de Copenhague. De acuerdo con los dos primeros parámetros, el Acuerdo de 
Copenhague no es satisfactorio. Desde el punto de vista político, sin embargo, la 
conclusión es ligeramente diferente, aunque no positiva. Esta nota concluye defendiendo 
que, después del Acuerdo de Copenhague, el futuro del régimen jurídico internacional del 
cambio climático será, previsiblemente, más fragmentado, siendo el Acuerdo una pieza más 
dentro del rompecabezas global del carbono. 
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Summary: I. Introduction; II. The Copenhagen Accord. 1. The environmental integrity of the Copenhagen 
Accord. 2. The nature of the Copenhagen Accord. 3. The political relevance of the Copenhagen Accord. III. 
Conclusions: The Copenhagen Accord and the fragmentation of the international climate change regime. IV. 
Bibliography. Annex I: The Copenhagen Accord. Annex II: Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 
2020. Annex III: Nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing country Parties. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the fifth Meeting of the Parties 
(COP/MOP) of the Kyoto Protocol took place in Copenhagen from 7 to 18 December 2009. 
More than 50.000 participants were accredited and 120 Heads of State and Governments 
participated in the high level segment making the Copenhagen Conference the highest 
profile meeting of any multilateral environmental agreement. In this paper I will focus only 
on the Copenhagen Accord and, in particular, on how it deals with mitigation. I will assess 
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it from an environmental, legal and political point of view in order to draw some 
conclusions on the future of the international climate change regime1.  
 
II. THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD 
International climate change negotiations have followed two parallel tracks in the last 
years: one under the UNFCCC and the other under the Kyoto Protocol. The first track was 
launched in Bali, at the thirteenth COP of the UNFCCC, and countries were meant to 
devise ways to achieve “full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention 
through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012”2. Under the second 
track countries have been negotiating ways to enhance further Kyoto Protocol Annex I 
Parties’ obligations3.  
Both tracks should have ended at the Copenhagen Conference, but it was clear in the 
meetings prior to COP15 and COP/MOP5 that this would not be achieved4. While some 
countries, and the EU in particular, were aiming for a new legally binding international 
treaty, still there was hope to be able to secure, at least, a range of COP decisions that 
would have been able to guide the negotiations further in the aftermath of Copenhagen. 
These hopes were also frustrated when, at the end of the two weeks of negotiations, a rather 
small (albeit influential) group of countries was able to broker the Copenhagen Accord, 
which is not a COP decision. Decision -/CP.15 “takes note of the Copenhagen Accord”.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this brief I will not be providing a complete analysis of the negotiations that have taken place during the 
two weeks in Copenhagen. For a detailed study of the latter see WEMAËRE M., “State of play of the 
international climate change negotiations: what are the results of the Copenhagen Conference?”, Carbon and 
Climate Law Review, no. 4.1, 2010, pp. 106-111; DUBASH N.K., “Copenhagen: Climate of Mistrust”, 
Economic and Political Weekly, no. 52, 2009, pp. 8-11. Nor will I focus on how the Copenhagen Accord 
deals with adaptation, reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) and finance, 
which feature prominently in the document; see § 3 for adaptation, § 6 for REDD; § 8 for finance, including 
the establishment of a High Level Panel and of the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, respectively at § 9 and 
10. 
2 Decision 1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, § 1. The Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
(AWG-LCA) has been in charge of negotiations under this track.  
3 The Ad Hoc Working Group on Future Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-
KP) has been in charge of negotiations under this track. 
4 See an analysis of the 2009 talks in Bangkok and in Barcelona in WEMAËRE M., “State of Play of 
International Negotiations: On the Road to Copenhagen” in Carbon and Climate Law Review, no. 3.4, 2009, 
pp. 497-502 
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I will now move on and assess the Copenhagen Accord from an environmental, legal and 
political parameter in order to determine whether the outcomes of the talks in Copenhagen 
can be hailed as a success or a failure.  
 
1. The environmental integrity of the Copenhagen Accord 
For an international regime to properly tackle climate change it needs to meet the final 
objective of the UNFCCC, which is to prevent dangerous climate change5. According to 
most scientific reports an overall increase in the world’s temperature above 1.5 degrees will 
lead to dangerous climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
has suggested in its Fourth Assessment Report that a reduction in the range of 25 to 40% 
from 1990 levels is needed in order to avoid this6. Does the Copenhagen Accord set this 
environmental target and does it provide the necessary tools to achieve it? 
The answer is no. On the one hand, the goal of the States that have affiliated themselves to 
the Copenhagen Accord is not to limit the overall temperature increase to 1.5 degrees, but 
“to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius”7. One has to 
acknowledge that countries were aware that “deep cuts in global emissions are required 
according to science”,8 but no mention of specific cuts has been included in the 
Copenhagen Accord. Furthermore, by making an explicit reference to the need for revising 
the Copenhagen Accord in 2015 in order to consider ways to achieve a maximum increase 
of 1.5 degrees9, the document shows a current lack of ambition from an environmental 
perspective. In sum, contrary to the Kyoto Protocol where a specific cap was established 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 
March 1994) (1992), 31 ILM 822, art. 2: “The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal 
instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved 
within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” 
6 PACHAURI R.K. and RESINGER A. (Eds.), IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2007 
Synthesis Report, Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, 2007. Accessed on 15/04/10, at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
7 Copenhagen Accord, § 2. 
8 Ibid. 
9	  Ibid. § 12.	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(5% reduction from 1990 levels)10, the Copenhagen Accord refers very loosely to 
reductions in emissions necessary to avoid a 2.0 degree increase in overall temperatures 
taking into account the general objective of the UNFCCC, but it does not establish any 
specific cap. 
On the other hand, the Copenhagen Accord has created a bottom up approach to mitigate 
climate change. The Kyoto Protocol not only established a general cap, baseline and base 
year, but it also indicated how much each Annex I Party had to reduce in the 2008-2012 
commitment period11. The Copenhagen Accord enshrines a much more flexible approach in 
as far as it gives each State, both industrialized and developing, the possibility to decide its 
level of climate change mitigation ambition12. This bottom up approach is the content of the 
so called “pledges” that all countries that decide to affiliate themselves to the Copenhagen 
Accord were asked to submit to the UNFCCC Secretariat by 31 January 201013. Annexes II 
and III of this article include excerpts of the pledges from key States, whose action in 
relation to climate change mitigation will be critical to tackle climate change efficiently.  
Leaving aside for the moment the nature of these pledges, the environmental integrity of a 
regime based on the Copenhagen Accord would depend on whether the compliance with 
the emissions reductions level provided for in the pledges would actually limit an overall 
increase in temperatures to 2.0 degrees (or even better, 1.5 degrees). This does not seem to 
be the case. On the one hand, the first analysis of the pledges shows that, even if they were 
complied with, they would not deliver the necessary emission reductions needed to avoid 
dangerous climate change14. On the other hand, most of these pledges are conditional on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 10 December 1997) 
(1998) 37 ILM 22, art. 3.1 
11 Ibid., Annex B. 
12 Thereby one country can decide to use, for example, 1990 as base year, while another can adopt 2005 for 
the same purpose. One country highly committed to mitigating climate change may decide for a 30% 
reduction, while another country may decide for a much less ambitious target. Finally, one country may 
decide to reduce on a historical basis following the methodology provided for in the Kyoto Protocol, while 
another one can decide to reduce emissions based on a per capita, or per gross national product basis. See 
different examples in the pledges from industrialised and developing countries in Annex II and III.  
13 Copenhagen Accord, § 4 and 5. 
14 See LEVIN K. and BRADLEY R., “Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction Pledges,” WRI 
Working Paper, World Resources Institute, Washington DC, p. 2. Accessed on 15/04/10, at 
http://www.wri.org.  
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similar climate change mitigation action taken by other countries, as is the case of the EU15, 
or, as in the case of the Russian federation and South Africa16, conditional on the nature of 
future emission reduction obligations.  
This last point leads us to assess the nature of the obligations provided for in the 
Copenhagen Accord in order to determine whether they can be considered to be legally 
binding or just recommendatory. 
 
2. The nature of the Copenhagen Accord 
While having a legally binding international treaty does not mean per se that the 
environmental problem dealt therewith will definitely be solved, hard law does usually 
have at least two characteristics that enable countries to tackle efficiently an environmental 
problem. On the one hand, a legally binding instrument will have enforceable obligations 
that are binding upon State Parties and, on the other hand, it will have a compliance system 
that will establish a mechanism that will address situations of non-compliance. Does the 
Copenhagen Accord, despite its environmental pitfalls, have clear cut obligations and a 
strong compliance system? 
Once again the answer is no. On the one hand, the system of pledges provided for in the 
Copenhagen Accord both for industrialized and emerging developing countries is, as we 
have seen, a bottom up approach where States are free to decide their level of ambition in 
relation to climate mitigation. Furthermore, and this is clear from the text of the pledges 
themselves, the nature of the obligation to which they are committing themselves is 
voluntary, not binding. In particular, developing countries, such as China, made it very 
clear that they do not consider themselves legally bound by their pledges17.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 An example of this approach comes from the EU that has committed itself to a unilateral 20% reduction 
from 1990 levels by 2020, which would increase to a 30% reduction if “other developed countries commit 
themselves to comparable emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately according 
to their responsibilities and respective capabilities”; see EU pledge in Annex II of this brief. See also the 28 
January 2010 Press Release 57/62 for the EU pledge.  
16 See Annex II and III of this paper. 
17 See China´s pledge in Annex III: “Please note that the above-mentioned autonomous domestic mitigation 
actions are voluntary in nature.” 
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On the other hand, the Copenhagen Accord does not mention the compliance system 
provided for in the Kyoto Protocol18, which has been hailed as one of the most advanced of 
any MEA.19 The Enforcement Branch of the latter has the power to take measures against 
countries found in non compliance with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol20. In the 
Copenhagen Accord “compliance” becomes “measurement, report and verification 
(MRV)”, which seems to be structured in three different ways depending on whose 
mitigation action is considered. First, climate change mitigation action enshrined in pledges 
from Annex I countries will be “measured, reported and verified in accordance with 
existing and any further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties”21. Second, 
mitigation action undertaken by developing countries will be subject to domestically 
established MRV. The Copenhagen Accord states as follows: “[M]itigation actions taken 
by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting and 
verification the result of which will be reported through their national communications 
every two years”22. Finally, non Annex I countries can also decide to adopt mitigation 
action, which will be supported by international assistance. In this third instance the 
Copenhagen Accord establishes that: “[T]hese supported nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions will be subject to international measurement, reporting and verification in 
accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties”23. 
Two comments can be made on the MRV system provided for in the Copenhagen Accord. 
On the one hand, both for mitigation action taken by Annex I countries and for supported 
climate change mitigation action by Non Annex I countries the system requires further 
development through the COP. In other words, the system, as it currently stands, is not 
“operational immediately”, despite what is stated in the preamble to the Copenhagen 
Accord… On the other hand, it is not clear what kind of consequences may arise if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Kyoto Protocol, art. 18 and Decision 27/CP.7, Procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
19 On the Kyoto compliance system see, amongst others, CAMPINS ERITJA M., FERNÁNDEZ PONS X. 
and HUICI SANCHO L., “Compliance Mechanisms in the Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
the Kyoto Protocol”, Revue Générale de Droit, no. 34.1, 2004, pp. 51-105.  
20 Decision 27/CP.7, Section V, § 6. 
21 Copenhagen Accord, § 4. 
22 Ibid., § 5. Emphasis added. 
23 Ibid., § 5. 
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countries, in particular developing countries, do not comply with their pledges. Firstly, 
these are voluntary in nature, therefore not binding. Secondly, they will be subject to 
“domestic” MRV. It is arguably unlikely to see a State adopting “serious consequences”, 
using the Kyoto Protocol terminology, against itself for an alleged non compliance with 
voluntary climate mitigation targets…  
These observations on the nature of the obligations provided for in the Copenhagen Accord, 
and on its MRV system, lead to the conclusion that we are before a soft law document, 
whose obligations are not binding. This conclusion will be disappointing for civil society 
members and those countries that prior to the Copenhagen conference were aiming for a 
legally binding treaty (hard law) that would either replace the Kyoto Protocol, or stand 
beside it.  
Not only can one find problems regarding the nature of the obligations present in the 
Copenhagen Accord; most commentators are also puzzled about the nature of the 
Copenhagen Accord per se. The latter is not a COP decision, albeit a COP decision “takes 
note” of it, which is a novelty within the international climate change regime24. It is also not 
an international treaty, according to the rules provided for in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties25. I agree with Matthieu Wemaëre in maintaining that the Copenhagen 
Accord is a “gentlemen’s agreement”26, which may not include legally binding obligations, 
but does put some pressure, moral if nothing else, on those countries that have affiliated 
themselves to it and have submitted their pledges to the UNFCCC Secretariat. In other 
words, the Copenhagen Agreement can be seen as a “political compromise”, that stands 
close, but formally not within the international climate change legal regime. 
This last observation leads us to consider whether the Copenhagen Accord, while possibly 
not a success from an environmental or a strictly legal point of view, may provide some 
leeway from a political point of view. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See an analysis on the legal difficulties arising from the nature of the Copenhagen Accord in RAJAMANI 
L., Neither Fish nor Fowl, Centre for Policy Research Climate Initiative Seminar 606, February, 2010.  
25 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 ILM 1969, p. 679. 
26 WEMAËRE, “State of play” cit., p. 110, 
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3. The political relevance of the Copenhagen Accord 
One can argue that the main weakness of the Kyoto Protocol has been the failure to have on 
board the - until very recently - biggest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions (the US) and 
the fact that it did not set any emission reduction obligations for developing countries with 
emerging economies (countries like China or Brazil). 
Obviously, this has nothing to do with the MEA itself, but, on the one hand, with the 
unwillingness of the previous US administration to commit itself to the Kyoto Protocol, 
even if under the Clinton administration it had actively participated in the shaping of the 
Kyoto Protocol, and of its flexible mechanisms in particular. On the other hand, developing 
countries were not asked to commit to any specific emission reduction obligations in 
application of the principle of the common but differentiated responsibilities, which is a 
principle that underpins both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol27. Furthermore, the lack 
of climate change mitigation commitment by the US and the different action required by 
developing countries are linked and feed each other. The main argument of the US for not 
committing itself to binding obligations has always been the absence of similar obligations 
for countries such as China, India or Brazil28. Has the Copenhagen Accord bridged the gap 
between the US and emerging developing countries?  
A preliminary analysis of the Copenhagen Conference seems to indicate that the political 
deadlock between the US and emerging developing countries may not have been solved 
completely, but at least it has been addressed. The Copenhagen Accord was negotiated and 
brokered mainly between the US and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and 
China). Despite all the doubts that one may have on the environmental integrity and on the 
legal nature of the Copenhagen Accord, one cannot deny that it is the first time in at least a 
decade that the US and emerging developing countries have agreed to a framework through 
which to deal with climate change mitigation and adaptation in the future. In order to tackle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 UNFCCC, art. 3 and Kyoto Protocol, preamble.  
28 See, for example, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution (US Senate Resolution 98) of 12 June 1997, which stated: 
“Whereas the Senate strongly believes that the proposals under negotiation, because of the disparity of 
treatment between Annex I Parties and Developing Countries and the level of required emission reductions, 
could result in serious harm to the United States economy, including significant job loss, trade and 
disadvantages, increased energy and consumer costs, or any combination thereof; . . .” 
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climate change efficiently, the international community needs to have the biggest emitters 
sitting at the same table, and this happened on the last day of the Copenhagen Conference.  
The downside of the gentleman’s agreement between the US and the BASIC countries is its 
content. As we have seen, both from an environmental and from a legal perspective, it is 
not satisfactory. A closer look at the Copenhagen Accord and, in particular, at the pledges 
that derive from it, shows that the balance between industrialized and developing countries, 
and also between industrialized countries, lies on thin ice. On the one hand, all climate 
change mitigation action from developing countries is voluntary and, in some cases, 
conditional upon international financial and technical assistance29, or upon the conclusion 
of a legally binding agreement in Cancun at COP1630. On the other hand, some 
industrialized countries make their level of climate change mitigation ambition conditional 
upon neighbor countries’ climate action31, or upon climate packages in emerging 
developing countries32.  
More than the voluntary nature of the obligations, which would not be a problem should 
there be real political will to tackle climate change, what is worrying is the “conditional” 
nature of these obligations. The moment one country considers that the variables needed to 
take action are no longer present, it will feel free to downsize its climate change mitigation 
action in detriment of the effectiveness of the international climate change regime. In other 
words, it is very easy to foresee that the ice on which the Copenhagen Accord stands may 
easily break, since this will happen when even just one key country does not comply with 
voluntary targets it has set itself, possibly leading to a domino effect because of 
competitiveness concerns.  
In sum, while a first look at the Copenhagen Accord may seem positive from a political 
point of view since it enables the US and key emerging developing countries, such as China 
and Brazil, to follow a common path, the conditional nature of the voluntary obligations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Mexico’s pledge in Annex III. 
30 See South Africa’s pledge in Annex III. 
31 See Canada’s pledge in relation to US climate policy in Annex II. 
32 See the EU’s position in its pledge in Annex II. 
RCDA Vol. I – Núm. 1 (2010)  The Copenhagen Accord…	  
 11 
may very quickly undermine any positive outcome arising from the Copenhagen 
Conference.  
 
III. CONCLUSIONS: THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD AND THE 
FRAGMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 
The Copenhagen Accord has been defined in a number of ways. Lavanya Rajamani has 
been amongst the most critical in her commentary maintaining that: 
“[T]he Copenhagen Accord can plausibly be characterized as ‘rotten’ not just because it is 
weak and will not contain climate change in its current form, but also because even in this 
weak form it faces considerable legal and procedural challenges to its operationalization”33. 
Daniel Bodansky takes a more pragmatic approach by stating that: 
“[A]lthough the Copenhagen Accord has been criticized by some as inadequate or worse, it 
represents a potentially significant breakthrough... The Copenhagen Accord may well 
represent the high-water mark of climate change regime for some time to come”34. 
In this paper on the Copenhagen Accord we position ourselves somewhere in the middle. 
We do not go so far as to say that it a “rotten” document, but we also do not believe that it 
can be considered “a significant breakthrough”.  
We have argued that the Copenhagen Accord can be assessed under environmental, legal 
and political parameters. Our conclusion is that it clearly fails under the first two 
parameters, while a preliminary analysis may seem to provide a more positive conclusion if 
assessed solely from a political point of view.  
From an environmental point of view, the Copenhagen Accord fails because, even if 
pledges were complied with, overall increase in average temperatures will not be limited to 
2 degrees. Furthermore, the bottom up approach established in the Copenhagen Accord 
provides too much flexibility to countries in their climate change mitigation action.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 RAJAMANI L., note 24 above, p. 26. 
34 BODANSKY D., “The Copenhagen Climate Accord”, ASIL Insight, no 14.3, 2010, p. 4. 
F. Sindico  RCDA Vol. I – Núm. 1 (2010) 
 12 
From a legal point of view the Copenhagen Accord also fails because the obligations 
provided for therein are only voluntary and the MRV system moves away from the 
compliance system present in the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, the Copenhagen Accord 
itself finds itself in a sort of legal limbo, which does not help in understanding to what 
extent negotiations can rely on it to shape the future of the international climate change 
regime. 
Finally, from a political point of view, while the Copenhagen Accord did bring together 
key players such as the US and the BASIC countries, that actually were the ones able to 
broker the document in the last hours of the Copenhagen Conference, a closer look at the 
Copenhagen Accord leaves one with a different conclusion. The conditional nature of the 
voluntary obligations provided for therein does not seem to provide solid grounds for a 
future international climate change regime based on the Copenhagen Accord. 
If for all these reasons the Copenhagen Conference can be judged as a disappointment, 
what should we expect in the run up to COP16 and COP/MOP6 in Cancun in 2010? The 
Copenhagen Accord will be an important stepping stone for those countries that have 
affiliated themselves to it, but I am sceptical as to whether it will become the key 
framework of the future international climate change legal regime.  
My impression is that we are moving towards an increasingly fragmented scenario where, 
in the short term, the two negotiating tracks under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
will need to find ways to coexist with those negotiations that will have to start in order to 
make the Copenhagen Accord truly operational, if there is political will to do so.  
In the long term, the scenario may become even more complex with key countries 
becoming more and more uncomfortable with the painstaking process of international 
negotiations and deciding to pursue bilateral and regional routes to tackle climate change. 
At the same time, these countries will also start to consider arrangements with other key 
players (not only States, but business in particular) to advance new carbon markers through 
sectoral carbon trading and REDD (or REDD similar) mechanisms.  
Whether the future international climate change legal regime will be fragmented or not, 
only time will tell. There is an inherent risk if this occurs, which is to lose sight of the fact 
that climate change is a “global” phenomenon. Only a strong and common response from 
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the international community as a whole can provide a long lasting solution. International 
climate change negotiations throughout the next two years will show whether the 
Copenhagen Accord will lead towards a more unitary or more fragmented answer to the 
climate change challenge.  
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ANNEX I: THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD 
Advance unedited version 
Decision -/CP.15 
The Conference of the Parties,  
  
Takes note of the Copenhagen Accord of 18 December 2009.  
 
Copenhagen Accord 
 
The Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers, and other heads of the following 
delegations present at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009 in 
Copenhagen: [List of Parties] 
 
In pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2,  
 
Being guided by the principles and provisions of the Convention, 
 
Noting the results of work done by the two Ad hoc Working Groups, 
 
Endorsing decision x/CP.15 on the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action and decision x/CMP.5 that requests the Ad hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments of Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol to continue its work, 
 
Have agreed on this Copenhagen Accord which is operational immediately. 
 
RCDA Vol. I – Núm. 1 (2010)  The Copenhagen Accord…	  
 15 
1. We underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. 
We emphasise our strong political will to urgently combat climate change in accordance 
with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. 
To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the scientific view that the 
increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius, on the basis ofequity and 
in the context of sustainable development, enhance our long-term cooperative action to 
combat climate change. We recognize the critical impacts of climate change and the 
potential impacts of response measures on countries particularly vulnerable to its adverse 
effects and stress the need to establish a comprehensive adaptation programme including 
international support.  
2. We agree that deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science, 
and as documented by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report with a view to reduce global 
emissions so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take 
action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity. We should 
cooperate in achieving the peaking of global and national emissions as soon as possible, 
recognizing that the time frame for peaking will be longer in developing countries and 
bearing in mind that social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first 
and overriding priorities of developing countries and that a low-emission development 
strategy is indispensable to sustainable development.  
3. Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and the potential impacts of 
response measures is a challenge faced by all countries. Enhanced action and international 
cooperation on adaptation is urgently required to ensure the implementation of the 
Convention by enabling and supporting the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at 
reducing vulnerability and building resilience in developing countries, especially in those 
that are particularly vulnerable, especially least developed countries, small island 
developing States and Africa. We agree that developed countries shall provide adequate, 
predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and capacity-building to support 
the implementation of adaptation action in developing countries.  
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4. Annex I Parties commit to implement individually or jointly the quantified 
economy-wide emissions targets for 2020, to be submitted in the format given in Appendix 
I by Annex I Parties to the secretariat by 31 January 2010 for compilation in an INF 
document. Annex I Parties that are Party to the Kyoto Protocol will thereby further 
strengthen the emissions reductions initiated by the Kyoto Protocol. Delivery of reductions 
and financing by developed countries will be measured, reported and verified in accordance 
with existing and any further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and will 
ensure that accounting of such targets and finance is rigorous, robust and transparent.  
5. Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention will implement mitigation actions, 
including those to be submitted to the secretariat by non-Annex I Parties in the format 
given in Appendix II by 31 January 2010, for compilation in an INF document, consistent 
with Article 4.1 and Article 4.7 and in the context of sustainable development. Least 
developed countries and small island developing States may undertake actions voluntarily 
and on the basis of support. Mitigation actions subsequently taken and envisaged by Non-
Annex I Parties, including national inventory reports, shall be communicated through 
national communications consistent with Article 12.1(b) every two years on the basis of 
guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties. Those mitigation actions in 
national communications or otherwise communicated to the Secretariat will be added to the 
list in appendix II. Mitigation actions taken by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their 
domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will be reported 
through their national communications every two years. Non-Annex I Parties will 
communicate information on the implementation of their actions through National 
Communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly 
defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected. Nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions seeking international support will be recorded in a registry 
along with relevant technology, finance and capacity building support. Those actions 
supported will be added to the list in appendix II. These supported nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions will be subject to international measurement, reporting and verification 
in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.  
6. We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest 
degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and 
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agree on the need to provide positive incentives to such actions through the immediate 
establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of 
financial resources from developed countries.  
7. We decide to pursue various approaches, including opportunities to use markets, 
to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote mitigation actions. Developing 
countries, especially those with low emitting economies should be provided incentives to 
continue to develop on a low emission pathway.  
8. Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as 
improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, to enable and support enhanced action on mitigation, 
including substantial finance to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building, for 
enhanced implementation of the Convention. The collective commitment by developed 
countries is to provide new and additional resources, including forestry and investments 
through international institutions, approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010 . 2012 
with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. Funding for adaptation will be 
prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed 
countries, small island developing States and Africa. In the context of meaningful 
mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed countries commit to a 
goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of 
developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and 
private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. New multilateral 
funding for adaptation will be delivered through effective and efficient fund arrangements, 
with a governance structure providing for equal representation of developed and developing 
countries. A significant portion of such funding should flow through the Copenhagen Green 
Climate Fund. 
9. To this end, a High Level Panel will be established under the guidance of and 
accountable to the Conference of the Parties to study the contribution of the potential 
sources of revenue, including alternative sources of finance, towards meeting this goal.  
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10. We decide that the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund shall be established as an 
operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention to support projects, 
programme, policies and other activities in developing countries related to mitigation 
including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity-building, technology development and transfer.  
11. In order to enhance action on development and transfer of technology we decide 
to establish a Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology development and transfer in 
support of action on adaptation and mitigation that will be guided by a country-driven 
approach and be based on national circumstances and priorities.  
12. We call for an assessment of the implementation of this Accord to be completed 
by 2015, including in light of the Convention.s ultimate objective. This would include 
consideration of strengthening the long-term goal referencing various matters presented by 
the science, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius.  
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ANNEX II: QUANTIFIED ECONOMY-WIDE EMISSIONS TARGETS FOR 2020 
 
Annex I Parties Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020 
 Emissions reduction in 2020 Base year 
Australia -5% up to -15% or -25%  
Australia will reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions by 25% on 2000 levels by 2020 if 
the world agrees to an ambitious global deal 
capable of stabilising levels of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere at 450 ppm CO2-eq or 
lower. Australia will unconditionally reduce 
our emissions by 5% below 2000 levels by 
2020, and by up to 15% by 2020 if there is a 
global agreement which falls short of securing 
atmospheric stabilisation at 450 ppm CO2-eq 
and under which major developing economies 
commit to substantially restrain emissions and 
advanced economies take on commitments 
comparable to Australia's.  
2000 
Canada 17%, to be aligned with the final economy-
wide emissions target of the United States in 
enacted legislation. 
2005 
European Union 20%/30%  
As part of a global and comprehensive 
agreement for the period beyond 2012, the EU 
reiterates its conditional offer to move to a 30% 
reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, 
provided that other developed countries 
1990 
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commit themselves to comparable emission 
reductions and that developing countries 
contribute adequately according to their 
responsibilities and respective capabilities.  
Japan 25% reduction, which is premised on the 
establishment of a fair and effective 
international framework in which all major 
economies participate and on agreement by 
those economies on ambitious targets. 
1990 
New Zealand New Zealand is prepared to take on a 
responsibility target for greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions of between 10 per cent 
and 20 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020, if 
there is a comprehensive global agreement. 
This means: 
• the global agreement sets the world on a 
pathway to limit temperature rise to not more 
than 2° C; 
• developed countries make comparable efforts 
to those of New Zealand; 
• advanced and major emitting developing 
countries take action fully commensurate with 
their respective capabilities; 
• there is an effective set of rules for land use, 
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF); and 
• there is full recourse to a broad and efficient 
international carbon market. 
1990 
Norway 30-40% 
 
As part of a global and comprehensive 
1990 
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agreement for the period beyond 2012 where 
major emitting Parties agree on emissions 
reductions in line with the 2 degrees Celsius 
target, Norway will move to a level of 40% 
reduction for 2020. 
Russian Federation 15%-25% 
the range of the GHG emission reductions will 
depend on the following conditions: 
-  Appropriate accounting of the potential of 
Russia’s forestry in frame of contribution in 
meeting the obligations of the anthropogenic 
emissions reduction; 
-  Undertaking by all major emitters the legally 
binding obligations to reduce anthropogenic 
GHG emissions.  
1990 
United States of 
America 
In the range of 17%, in conformity with 
anticipated U.S. energy and climate legislation, 
recognizing that the final target will be reported 
to the Secretariat in light of enacted 
legislation.¹ 
¹The pathway set forth in pending legislation 
would entail a 30% reduction in 2025 and a 
42% reduction in 2030, in line with the goal to 
reduce emissions 83% by 2050. 
2005 
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ANNEX III: NATIONALLY APPROPRIATE MITIGATION ACTIONS OF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTIES 
 
Non-Annex I Actions 
Brazil Please note that the envisaged domestic actions as indicated are 
voluntary in nature and will be implemented in accordance with 
the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC,… 
- Reduction in Amazon deforestation  
- Reduction in “Cerrado” deforestation 
- Restoration of grazing land 
- Integrated crop-livestock system 
- No-till farming 
- Biological N2 fixaion 
- Energy efficiceny 
- Increase in the use of biofuels 
- Increase in energy supply by hydroelectric power plants 
- Alternative energy sources 
- Iron & steel (replace coal from deforestation with coal 
from planted forests) 
It is anticipated that these actions will lead to an expected 
reduction of 36,1% to 38,9% regarding the projected emissions of 
Brazil by 2020. 
China China will endeavor to lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit 
of GDP by 40-45% by 2020 compared to the 2005 level, increase 
the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 
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around 15% by 2020 and increase forest coverage by 40 million 
hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 
2020 from the 2005 levels. 
 
Please note that the above-mentioned autonomous domestic 
mitigation actions are voluntary in nature and will be implemented 
in accordance with the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC, 
in particular Article 4, paragraph 7. 
India India will endeavour to reduce the emissions1 intensity of its GDP 
by 20-25% by 2020 in comparison to the 2005 level. The 
emissions from agriculture sector will not form part of the 
assessment of emissions intensity. 
 
Please note that the proposed domestic actions are voluntary in 
nature and will not have legally binding character. 
Mexico Mexico adopted its Special Climate Change Program in 2009 
including a set of nationally appropriate mitigation and adaptation 
actions to be undertaken in all relevant sectors. The full 
implementation of the Programme will achieve a reduction in total 
annual emissions of 51 million tons of CO2e by 2012, with respect 
to the business as usual scenario.  
 
Mexico aims at reducing its GHG emissions up to 30% with 
respect to the business as  usual  scenario  by  2020,  provided  the  
provision  of  adequate  financial  and technological support from 
developed countries as part of a global agreement. 
South Africa South Africa reiterates that it will take nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions to enable a 34% deviation below the ‘Business 
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As Usual’ emission growth trajectory by 2020 and a 42% 
deviation below the ‘Business As Usual’ emission growth 
trajectory by 2025. In accordance with article 4.7 of the 
Convention, the extent to which this action will be implemented 
depends on the provisions of financial resources, the transfer of 
technology and capacity building support by developed countries. 
Therefore, the above actions requires the finalisation of an 
ambitious, fair, effective and binding multilateral agreement under 
the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol at COP 16 and CMP6 in 
Mexico to enable the delivery of this support. 
 
 
